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INTRODUCTION 
Under United States labor law, when a majority of employees in a bargaining 
unit choose union representation, all employees in the unit are then represented by 
the union and the union must represent all of the employees equally.1 Twenty-four 
states, however, have enacted laws granting such union-represented employees the 
right to refuse to pay the union for the services the union is legally obligated to 
provide.2 Although the name prompts strong objection from union supporters, 
these laws are known as “right-to-work” laws. 
Right-to-work laws have been around for decades,3 but they have come to 
national prominence again as another round of states has enacted the legislation. 
Michigan—a state with relatively high levels of union density4—enacted a right-to-
work statute in 2012, and Indiana became a right-to-work state in 2010.5 As a 
 
* The authors are, respectively, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School 
of Law, and Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry, Harvard Law School. Professor Fisk thanks 
Daniel Schieffer, and Professor Sachs thanks Ani Gevorkian for excellent research assistance. 
1. National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). 
2. Right to Work Resources, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues 
-research/labor/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). 
3. See id. 
4. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERSHIP IN 
MICHIGAN–2012 (2013). 
5. See IND. CODE. § 22-6-6-8 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); 2012 Mich. Pub. 
Acts No. 348 (private sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.1, 423.2, 423.8, 423.14, 423.17, 423.22; 2012 
Mich. Pub. Acts No. 349 (public sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.201, 423.209, 423.210, 423.214, 
423.215. An effort is also underway in Canada to adopt the so-called right-to-work principle, which to 
date Canada has not had. See Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Allen Ponak, Mandatory Agency Shop Laws as an 
Explanation of Canada-U.S. Union Density Divergence, 22 J. LAB. RES. 541, 544 (2001) (describing that no 
form of union security agreement is prohibited in Canada); see also PATHS TO PROSPERITY: FLEXIBLE 
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result, unions with preexisting and extensive memberships must now operate 
under the peculiar rules that such legislation imposes. In particular, these unions 
must now represent equally—with respect to both collective bargaining and 
administration—those workers who exercise their state-law rights to pay exactly 
nothing for the union’s representation. 
From our perspective, the problem with right-to-work laws derives from 
their intersection with federal labor law. As is well understood, federal labor law 
implements a regime of exclusive representation.6 A union that wishes to establish 
a right to collective bargaining must secure support from a majority of the workers 
in a given bargaining unit; when it does so, the union then represents all of the 
workers in the unit for collective bargaining purposes.7 Importantly, although the 
union represents all of the workers in a bargaining unit, no worker need actually 
become a member of the union.8 This is true both in right-to-work states and in 
non-right-to-work states: everywhere in the United States, unions operate under a 
regime of exclusive representation; nowhere in the United States may any worker 
be compelled to become a union member.9 With exclusive representation, 
moreover, comes a judicially crafted duty of fair representation. Under this duty, 
the union is required to represent all workers in the bargaining unit equally, and 
may not discriminate between those who become union members and those who 
do not.10 The duty extends not just to collective bargaining—in which the union 
cannot bargain terms that favor members over nonmembers—but to disciplinary 
matters as well.11 The union must grieve and arbitrate on behalf of nonmembers 
just as zealously (and as expensively) as it does on behalf of members. 
In non-right-to-work states, federal law enables unions to require that 
nonmembers pay for the services they receive. Under section 8(a)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), unions and employers can agree to 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements that require all employees in a 
bargaining unit, as a condition of employment, to pay to the union dues and fees 
that are the equivalent of what members pay to support the union’s collective 
 
LABOUR MARKETS: AN ONTARIO PC CAUCUS WHITE PAPER (2012) (proposing adoption of right-
to-work law in Ontario), available at http://timhudakmpp.com/wp-content/uploads/Flexible-Labour-
Markets.pdf; Sunny Freeman, Bill 85, Saskatchewan Employment Act, Erodes Union Power, Sets New Tone for 
Labour Relations in Canada, HUFFINGTON POST CANADA (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:31 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/04/09/bill-85-saskatchewan-employment-act_n_3039850.html. 
Professor David Doorey has analyzed the proposed right-to-work regime in Canada on his blog: 
David Doorey, Some Implications of a Canadian “Right to Work” Law, LAW WORK (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://lawofwork.ca/?p=7011. 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159; Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 
(1975). 
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
8. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743–45 (1963). 
9. Id. 
10. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944). 
11. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). 
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bargaining and contract administration functions.12 Thus, in non-right-to-work 
states, the union has a duty to represent nonmembers, but the nonmembers can 
be required to pay for that representation. In right-to-work states, on the other 
hand, the union still bears the same federal duty to represent nonmembers, but 
state law precludes a requirement that the nonmembers pay for that 
representation. 
This, we contend, is a confluence of federal and state rules that creates an 
inequity in U.S. labor law that calls for resolution. If state law is to allow workers 
to decline union membership and to decline to pay for union representation, 
federal law ought not require that the union nonetheless provide equal 
representation to the nonpaying nonmember. 
We see three potential approaches to remedying the inequity in current law. 
First, and most straightforwardly, we believe that the best reading of section 14(b) 
of the NLRA—the provision in the federal statute that allows states to pass right-
to-work laws13—suggests that federal law does not in fact permit states to ban all 
mandatory payments from workers to unions—something that many right-to-
work laws, including Michigan’s, do.14 Under a proper reading of the statute, states 
can ban compulsory union membership, and they can ban any agreement that 
makes it a condition of employment that workers pay dues and fees equivalent to 
what members pay to support the union’s collective bargaining and contract 
administration functions. But states cannot, consistent with federal law, prohibit 
agreements under which nonmembers are compelled to pay dues and fees lower 
than those required of members. Thus, for example, an agreement that requires all 
members to pay the pro rata share of membership dues that go to grievance and 
arbitration costs must be legal everywhere in the United States. 
Second, in any state where employees are permitted to avoid paying anything 
to unions, federal law ought to relax the requirement of exclusive representation 
and allow unions to organize, bargain on behalf of, and represent only those 
workers who affirmatively choose to become members. In brief, if workers 
exercise their right not to be represented by a union and not to pay for the union’s 
services, federal law ought to allow the union to construct a bargaining unit that 
does not include those workers. The proposal constitutes a win-win. Workers who 
do not want to be union could now genuinely be nonunion—they would owe 
nothing to the union, they would not be covered by the collective bargaining 
agreement, and they would pursue interactions with the employer without union 
involvement. For the unions’ part, they would no longer be obligated to represent 
those workers who do not desire such representation and who do not wish to pay 
 
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
13. See id. § 164(b). 
14. See 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 348 (private sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.1, 423.2, 423.8, 
423.14, 423.17, 423.22; 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 349 (public sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.201, 
423.209, 423.210, 423.214, 423.214. 
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for it. Put simply, this proposal would implement a members-only bargaining 
regime in right-to-work states. 
Our third, and perhaps slightly more circumscribed, proposal would 
maintain the principle of exclusive representation in right-to-work states, but 
change slightly the union’s duties with respect to nonmembers in those states. In 
particular, we propose that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) 
abandon its rule forbidding unions from charging nonmembers a fee for 
representation services that the union provides directly and individually to the 
nonmember. Under the Board’s current rule—which is dictated neither by statute 
nor judicial interpretation—a union violates section 8(b)(1)(A) of the federal law if 
it insists that nonmembers pay for representation in disciplinary matters, even in 
right-to-work states where the nonmember has a right not to pay for the union’s 
representation generally.15 We believe that in right-to-work states, it ought to be 
within a union’s discretion to charge nonpaying nonmembers if those 
nonmembers wish to have the union represent them in disciplinary matters. 
Unlike the NLRB, we do not believe that charging an employee the fair price of a 
union service coerces that person, within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A), to 
become a union member or restrains his or her ability to refuse to support the 
union. 
I. READING SECTION 14(b) 
When a union bargains a collective agreement with an employer, the benefits 
of the agreement—including, for example, wage and benefit gains, enhanced job 
security, and improved mechanisms for voice at work—extend to all of the 
employees covered by the agreement.16 Current law, moreover, requires unions to 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements on behalf of all of the employees in a 
particular bargaining unit.17 This implies that whatever benefits the union secures 
through the collective agreement will accrue to every employee in the unit. This in 
turn presents a classic threat of free riding: the risk is that workers in the unit will 
seek to receive the benefits of the union’s collective actions without contributing 
resources necessary to secure those benefits. Indeed, Mancur Olson used the 
union context to describe what he saw as the quintessential collective action 
problem.18 
Unions have attempted to respond to this free rider problem through a 
variety of mechanisms that have evolved over time, but that all share the same 
central feature: they require employees who benefit from a collective agreement to 
 
15. Furniture Workers Div., Local 282, 291 N.L.R.B. 182, 183 (1988); Columbus Area Local, 
Am. Postal Workers Union, 277 N.L.R.B. 541, 543 (1985); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, Local Union No. 697, 223 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 (1976). 
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
17. Id. 
18. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 66–97 (1965 & 1971). 
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share in the costs of securing those benefits. Prior to 1947, unions and employers 
often required employees to be members of the union at the time of hiring.19 In 
1947, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited these “closed shop” agreements, but 
continued to allow other so-called union security agreements that require 
employees to become union members after hiring.20 The amended statute 
continues to provide, however, that employment may not be conditioned on 
union membership if such membership is “denied or terminated for reasons other 
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.”21 
When Congress banned the closed shop, however, it also added section 
14(b) to the statute, giving states some latitude to legislate in the union security 
area. Thus, although the federal statute permits unions and employers to bargain 
contract clauses that require employees to pay dues and fees to the union, section 
14(b) of the statute allows states to proscribe some such agreements. In particular, 
section 14(b) dictates that nothing in the federal statute “shall be construed as 
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a 
labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which 
such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”22 By its 
terms, then, section 14(b) allows states to prohibit agreements that require 
“membership” in a union. 
The question is how to read section 14(b)’s use of the term “membership.” 
A strictly literal reading of the section would allow states to forbid collective 
bargaining clauses that required, as a condition of employment, that a worker 
actually become a member of a union. On this reading, state right-to-work laws that 
prohibited compulsory payment of dues and fees would be preempted by the 
NLRA. After all, section 14(b) only allows states to prohibit “membership”; it says 
nothing about whether states can prohibit payment of fees for services that federal 
law compels unions to provide. 
But the Supreme Court has held that section 14(b)’s definition of 
“membership” is broader than its literal construction. In its NLRB v. General 
Motors Corp. decision, the Court was faced with the question of whether section 
8(a)(3) of the statute allowed unions to require the payment of dues and fees even 
from those who did not become members of the union.23 The union had 
proposed a collective bargaining agreement provision that required nonmember 
employees to pay the union a fee for the services the union provided (generally 
 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). 
20. As amended by Taft-Hartley, section 8(a)(3) expressly allows employers and unions to 
agree “to require as a condition of employment membership [in the union] on or after the thirtieth 
day following the beginning of such employment.” Id. 
21. Id. 
22. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). 
23. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 735 (1963). 
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known as an “agency fee” provision).24 The employer insisted that the only form 
of union security device that the NLRA authorized was a union shop provision 
that requires employees actually to become union members after the date of hire.25 
The Court rejected the employer’s argument and held that Congress had, with the 
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, changed the “meaning of ‘membership’ for the 
purposes of union-security contracts.”26 Unions and employers, the Court 
reasoned, could agree to union security devices that require employees to do less 
than is required by a union shop.27 In particular, the Court held that “[i]t is 
permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar 
as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon 
payment of fees and dues.”28 Thus, “‘membership’ as a condition of employment 
is whittled down to its financial core.”29 This, the Court explained, “serves, rather 
than violates, the desire of Congress to reduce the evils of compulsory unionism 
while allowing financial support for the bargaining agent.”30 
Then, in Retail Clerks International Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, the Court 
extended the General Motors section 8(a)(3) analysis to the section 14(b) context.31 
Schermerhorn holds that although section 8(a)(3) and section 14(b)—which both 
turn on a definition of “membership”—may not be “perfectly coincident,” they 
nonetheless “overlap to some extent.”32 In particular, the Court held that the type 
of agency shop agreement that was at issue in General Motors—one in which all 
employees in the bargaining unit are required to pay the equivalent of the dues and 
fees paid by members—“imposes on employees the only membership obligation 
enforceable under [section] 8(a)(3) . . . [and] is the ‘practical equivalent’ of an 
‘agreement requiring membership in a labor organization.’”33 Since an agency shop 
agreement that requires payment of the full amount of union dues is the practical 
equivalent of membership within the meaning of section 8(a)(3), and because 
section 8(a)(3) and section 14(b) overlap at least to some extent, the Court 
concluded that agency shop agreements also require membership within the 
meaning of section 14(b).34 Thus, under Schermerhorn, collective bargaining 
provisions that require all employees to pay the same dues and fees as members 
pay may be prohibited by state law, even though actual “membership” is not 
required by the collective bargaining agreement.35 
 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 741–43. 
26. Id. at 742. 
27. Id. at 741–42. 
28. Id. at 742. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 744. 
31. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 756–57 (1963). 
32. Id. at 751. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 751–52. 
35. See id. 
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But the Schermerhorn Court was careful to express an important caveat. 
Although agency fee agreements that required the same payments from 
nonmembers as were required from members could be prohibited by section 
14(b), that did not imply that “less stringent union-security arrangements” could 
also be prohibited.36 Indeed, the union in Schermerhorn argued that its agreement 
was distinguishable from the agency shop clause at issue in General Motors because 
the Schermerhorn agreement was less exacting of nonmembers.37 In particular, the 
Schermerhorn agreement “confine[d] the use of nonmember payments to collective 
bargaining purposes alone and forb[ade] their use by the union for institutional 
purposes unrelated to its exclusive agency functions.”38 In General Motors, by 
contrast, nonmembers were required to pay the same dues and initiation fees 
required of union members and to share with members the cost of “strike benefits, 
educational and retired member benefits, and union publications and promotional 
activities.”39 
The Schermerhorn Court went to some lengths—several pages in the United 
States Reports, in fact—to reject the union’s argument, but for reasons that affirm 
our key contention.40 As the Court explained, first, there was no support in the 
record for the union’s argument that its clause was distinct from a full agency shop 
agreement.41 There is, the Court wrote, “no ironclad restriction imposed upon the 
use of nonmember fees.”42 This mattered because if the union could use 
nonmember fees for purposes other than funding the costs of representing the 
nonmembers—for what the Court called “institutional purposes”43—the fee 
requirement would look more like a membership requirement than a fee-for-service 
arrangement.44 Second, even had the Schermerhorn agreement explicitly restricted 
the use of nonmember payments to “bargaining costs,” the fact that nonmembers 
paid exactly the same amount as members would render this fact “of bookkeeping 
significance only rather than a matter of real substance.”45 This is true because of 
the fungibility of money. Thus, if members and nonmembers pay the same 
amount, but nonmember money may only go to collective bargaining expenses, 
the union can simply reallocate some portion of member dues to non-collective 
bargaining expenses, and not see any change in its actual budget.46 
Two points are important here. First, and most generally, none of this 
analysis would matter unless there were, in fact, some types of mandatory dues 
 
36. See id. at 752. 
37. See id. 
38. Id. 
39. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963). 
40. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. at 752–54. 
41. See id. at 752–53. 
42. Id. at 752. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 752–53. 
45. Id. at 753. 
46. See id. at 754. 
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arrangements that are outside the scope of section 14(b). If it were the case that all 
mandatory payments could be banned by section 14(b), it would have been simple 
enough to say so. That the Court went through this analysis indicates clearly that 
this was not its position. Second, and more particularly, Schermerhorn makes clear 
that states can ban agreements that require nonmembers to pay what members 
pay: again, if members and nonmembers pay the same thing, the union cannot in 
any meaningful sense ensure that the nonmembers’ money covers only the actual 
costs of representation. But, by the same token, Schermerhorn did not hold or 
suggest that states can ban agreements that require nonmembers to pay less than 
what members pay. 
One final Supreme Court opinion requires attention. In Communications 
Workers of America v. Beck, the Supreme Court held that section 8(a)(3) permits a 
collective bargaining agreement to require nonmembers to pay mandatory dues or 
fees to support only the union’s collective bargaining and contract administration 
functions; an agreement may not require nonmembers to fund the union’s political 
operations.47 That is, the “membership” that can be required under section 8(a)(3) 
is whittled down to a requirement that the nonmember pay to the union whatever 
share of membership dues and fees are used for collective bargaining and contract 
administration functions, and for those functions alone. 
To sum up the discussion thus far, then, General Motors, Schermerhorn, and Beck 
together imply that the definition of “membership” relevant to both section 
8(a)(3) and section 14(b) is as follows: membership means the financial 
requirement of paying dues and fees equivalent to the share of member dues and 
fees that fund the union’s collective bargaining and contract administration 
functions. The definition of membership that emerges from the Court’s opinions 
is thus far broader than the literal “membership” to which section 14(b) refers, 
but not so broad as to cover all forms of mandatory payments from employees to 
unions. Indeed, the Court’s opinions suggest that a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement requiring all employees in a bargaining unit to pay the 
proportion of membership dues that cover members’ representation in 
disciplinary matters—but nothing more—would not “require membership” within 
the meaning of section 14(b).48 In general terms, so long as the required payments 
are less than what members pay to support collective bargaining and contract 
administration functions, they do not constitute the equivalent of membership and 
thus may not be prohibited. 
There is perhaps an obvious objection to our argument thus far. As we have 
seen, “membership” means the same thing in section 14(b) as it does in section 
8(a)(3).49 This ought to imply, the objection goes, that if states cannot ban clauses 
 
47. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988). 
48. See id. at 762–63; Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. at 752; NLRB. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 
734, 743–44 (1963). 
49. See Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. at 751. 
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requiring nonmembers to pay less than full membership dues (because those 
clauses do not require the equivalent of “membership”), then such clauses should 
be impermissible under section 8(a)(3) (allowing unions and employers to 
condition employment only on union “membership”). But, the objection 
concludes, because unions and employers clearly could enforce a union security 
agreement that required payment of less than full membership dues, we must be 
wrong to conclude that states cannot ban such clauses. 
This objection to our argument fails, though, and for an important reason. It 
is true that, in our view, membership means the same thing under section 14(b) 
and section 8(a)(3). Membership, as the Court has construed it, means the 
financial requirement of paying the equivalent of the dues and fees necessary to 
fund the union’s collective bargaining and contract administration functions.50 
But, for reasons we will explain immediately below, section 8(a)(3) allows unions 
and employers to enforce union security clauses that are less exacting of 
nonmembers than full compliance with the financial requirements of membership, 
while at the same time section 14(b) prohibits states from banning anything less 
exacting than the full financial requirements of membership. 
Section 8(a)(3) contains a statutory grant of authority to unions and 
employers.51 Under this provision of the NLRA, unions and employers have the 
authority to negotiate enforceable labor agreements that condition employment on 
an employee’s willingness to comply with the financial requirements of 
“membership,”52 as construed by the Court.53 Section 8(a)(3), moreover, 
determines the outer bounds of the authority granted to unions and employers—
the outer bounds of what collective bargaining agreements may require of 
nonmembers.54 Thus, collective bargaining agreements can require that employees 
pay the “dues and . . . fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership” in the union,55 but they may not require more of 
nonmembers—they may not, for example, require actual membership, nor may 
they require that nonmembers pay more than members.56 But because section 
8(a)(3) charts the limits of union and employer authority, the provision allows 
unions and employers to require less of nonmembers than payment of dues and 
fees “uniformly required” of members. Thus, to return to our example, a 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement requiring all employees in a unit to 
pay the proportion of membership dues that cover members’ representation in 
disciplinary matters—but nothing more—would be permissible under section 
8(a)(3) because it is less exacting than what section 8(a)(3) permits. 
 
50. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 758–69. 
51. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(2012). 
52. Id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. 
56. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 754 (1963). 
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Like section 8(a)(3), section 14(b) determines the outer bounds of the 
authority it grants—but rather than limiting the authority of unions and employers 
to enter agreements, it sets the outer bounds of what states may prohibit 
consistent with the NLRA.57 Thus, state right-to-work laws can ban collective 
bargaining agreements that “require membership” in a union—including the 
financial equivalent of membership as the Court has defined it—but they cannot 
ban more than that without exceeding the authority granted to them by federal law. 
So, when a state bans payments to a union that do not rise to the level of 
membership—again, as defined by the Court—they exceed the authority granted 
them under section 14(b). Because a provision in a collective bargaining agreement 
requiring employees to pay the proportion of membership dues that cover 
members’ representation in disciplinary matters would not “require 
membership,”58 a state does not have authority to ban it, even though such a 
provision is permissible under section 8(a)(3).59 
In sum, we have argued that under a proper reading of section 8(a)(3), 
section 14(b), and the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting those sections of the 
federal statute, states can ban compulsory union membership and union security 
clauses that require nonmembers to pay the same amount that union members pay 
in dues for collective bargaining and contract administration functions. States 
cannot, however, prohibit agreements under which nonmembers are compelled to 
pay less than this amount. For example, states may not ban agreements that 
require nonmembers to pay only the proportion of membership dues that cover 
representation in disciplinary matters. To adopt our proposal, moreover, would 
require no change in Supreme Court law or statutory language, but only a careful 
reading of the statute and the Court’s cases on point. 
II. A GENUINE RIGHT TO BE NONUNION 
Our first proposal would thus clarify the scope of federal preemption in a 
manner that would limit the permissible types of state right-to-work laws. An 
alternative approach to reconciling right-to-work laws with exclusive 
representation and the union’s duty of fair representation would leave state right-
to-work laws untouched, but would change the union’s obligations in those states 
by relaxing the requirements of exclusivity. Put simply, this proposal would 
implement a members-only bargaining regime in right-to-work states. 
Right-to-work laws reject the notion that all employees in a bargaining unit 
should be required to provide financial support to the union selected by the 
 
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). 
58. See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988). 
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). At least one case challenging a new right to work law in Indiana 
should therefore determine that section 14(b) preempts the state law to the extent that the law 
invalidates contract provisions requiring employees to pay anything less than what union members 
pay in dues for collective bargaining and contract administration. Sweeney v. Pence, No. 13-1264 (7th 
Cir. argued Sept. 12, 2013). 
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majority.60 There is, accordingly, a tension between state right-to-work regimes 
and the federal rule of exclusive representation, under which the union has an 
obligation to represent equally all employees in the bargaining unit.61 In brief, 
federal law requires unions to represent all employees in the unit while state right-
to-work laws give workers the right to refuse to contribute to that representation. 
As such, the current state of affairs in right-to-work states can be analogized to a 
political world in which anyone whose party lost an election could still go to 
public schools, drive on public highways, and benefit from public security without 
having to pay taxes to support those public goods. 
A principled approach to addressing this tension is to relax the requirement 
of exclusive representation and allow unions to organize, bargain on behalf of, and 
represent only those workers who affirmatively choose to become members. 
Those workers who wish to join a union and bargain collectively in right-to-work 
states should thus be permitted to construct a bargaining unit that includes only 
those workers willing to pay for union representation. Such a change in the law 
would simply take the right-to-work concept to its logically consistent and fair 
conclusion. It would allow workers who do not want to be union to genuinely be 
nonunion: they would owe nothing to the union, they would not be covered by 
the collective bargaining agreement, and they would pursue interactions with the 
employer without union interference. Unions, for their part, would no longer be 
obligated to represent those workers who do not desire such representation and 
who do not wish to pay for it. And workers who wish to unionize would no 
longer be required to subsidize representation for their nonmember coworkers 
who do not desire unionization.62 
 
60. See IND. CODE. § 22-6-6-8 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2d Reg. Sess.); 2012 Mich. Pub. 
Acts No. 348 (private sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.1, 423.2, 423.8, 423.14, 423.17, 423.17; 2012 
Mich. Pub. Acts No 349 (public sector), codified at M.C.L. 423.201, 423.209, 423.210, 423.214, 
423.215. 
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
62. Although our proposal is novel, it is not unprecedented. Tennessee, for example, recently 
abolished exclusivity for teachers’ unions and adopted a complex system of members-only bargaining. 
See Martin H. Malin, Sifting Through the Wreckage of the Tsunami that Hit Public Sector Bargaining, 16 EMP. 
RTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 533, 551–52 (2012). It is still too soon to know how unions will negotiate and 
administer contracts, whether significant numbers of teachers will exercise their rights to join unions 
or to refrain from doing so, and how school districts, unions, and individual teachers (or groups of 
nonunion teachers) will navigate a regime in which some teachers are covered by a union contract and 
others are not. See id. (explaining Tennessee’s new public sector labor relations law and considering its 
implications). But, whatever the outcome, Tennessee will offer some experimental evidence on the 
effects of a proposal like the one we are offering. See Martin H. Malin, Life After Act 10?: Is There a 
Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin Public Employees?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 623, 650–51 (2012) 
(discussing examples of members-only agreements in Tennessee). Furthermore, Florida and Nebraska 
allow members-only contract administration in the public sector. See Dennis O. Lynch, Incomplete 
Exclusivity and Fair Representation: Inevitable Tensions in Florida’s Public Sector Labor Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 573, 575–76 (1983) (explaining the operation of the Florida system); see also Neb. Rev. Stat § 48-
838 (2012). In Nebraska, for example, 
Any employee may choose his or her own representative in any grievance or legal action 
regardless of whether or not an exclusive collective bargaining agent has been certified. If 
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We briefly summarize the law on the issue of members-only unionization 
below. Professor Charles Morris has written a book-length argument that 
members-only bargaining is consistent with the language, intent, purpose, and 
policy of the NLRA, and it is not necessary to rehearse his arguments or the 
responses to it here.63 For present purposes, it is enough to note, first, that 
although the Board has never held that the statute requires members-only 
bargaining, there is significant support for that proposition in the structure of the 
statute and in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.64 Second, neither the Board, nor 
the courts, nor labor law scholars have addressed the slightly different question we 
discuss here: whether a union should have the right to select members-only 
bargaining in a state that has exercised its authority under section 14(b) to prohibit 
unions from requiring those who benefit from its services under the exclusivity 
principle to pay their pro rata share of the costs. In our view, whatever the 
arguments for members-only bargaining in non-right-to-work states, there are 
substantially stronger arguments for the Board to conclude that section 8(a)(5) 
requires members-only bargaining in right-to-work states. 
Nothing in section 7—which grants employees the rights “to self-
organization” and “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing”—limits these rights to workplaces where a majority of employees 
choose one union.65 Moreover, nothing in section 9 (which provides a mechanism 
for choosing a union that enjoys the power of exclusive representation) limits the 
ability of a group to bargain on a members-only basis.66 The law currently allows 
members-only representation.67 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, a 1938 
decision arising out of a dispute between two unions seeking to represent the 
same group of employees, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right of a 
 
an employee who is not a member of the labor organization chooses to have legal 
representation from the labor organization in any grievance or legal action, such employee 
shall reimburse the labor organization for his or her pro rata share of the actual legal fees 
and court costs incurred by the labor organization in representing the employee in such 
grievance or legal action. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-838 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). And the Supreme Courts of 
New Hampshire and Rhode Island both concluded that requiring a nonunion public sector employee 
to pay the reasonable costs of contract administration did not violate state right-to-work statutes or 
similar provisions prohibiting public sector unions from encouraging or requiring union membership. 
Nashua Teachers Union v. Nashua Sch. Dist., 707 A.2d 448, 451 (N.H. 1998); Town of N. 
Kingstown v. N. Kingstown Teachers Ass’n, 297 A.2d 342, 346 (R.I. 1972). 
63. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS 
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005). Many of the responses were sympathetic to Morris’s 
argument, although less than entirely convinced by it. See, e.g., Joseph E. Slater, Do Unions Representing a 
Minority of Employees Have the Right to Bargain Collectively?: A Review of Charles Morris, The Blue Eagle at 
Work, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 383 (2005) (book review). 
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. § 159. 
67. See Catherine Fisk & Xenia Tashlitsky, Imagine a World Where Employers Are Required to 
Bargain With Minority Unions, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 5–6 (2011). 
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union to bargain on behalf of its own members only.68 The employer in that case 
had agreed to recognize one of the unions as the representative of its own 
members and had entered an agreement governing their terms of employment.69 
The Board held the contract invalid because the union had not been certified 
under section 9(a) as the exclusive representative.70 The Court rejected the Board’s 
position.71 Although it did not have occasion to hold that an employer is obligated 
by section 8(a)(5) to bargain on a members-only basis (because no section 8(a)(5) 
charge had been pressed, since the employer had agreed to the contract), the 
Court insisted, in dictum, that members-only bargaining is necessary to protect the 
section 7 rights of union members absent a majority union.72 
The Court explained that the employees’ rights to form a union and bargain 
collectively gave them the right to do so on a members-only basis unless or until a 
union was certified under section 9.73 The Court also explained that members-only 
bargaining was entirely consistent with the policies of the NLRA: 
[I]n the absence of . . . an exclusive agency the employees represented by 
the Brotherhood, even if they were a minority, clearly had the right to 
make their own choice. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the Act is 
to protect interstate and foreign commerce from interruptions and 
obstructions caused by industrial strife. This purpose appears to be 
served by these contracts in an important degree.74 
The Court later held that members-only agreements are enforceable under section 
301, and again rejected the idea that members-only bargaining is inconsistent with 
the law and policy of the NLRA.75 
Although members-only bargaining is permissible under the NLRA if the 
employer agrees to engage in it, the NLRB has held that it is not required of 
employers. That is, the Board to date has declined to hold that an employer 
violates section 8(a)(5) if it refuses to negotiate with a union on a members-only 
basis.76 In Dick’s Sporting Goods, a minority of employees formed the Dick’s 
 
68. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 237 (1938). 
69. See id. at 218. 
70. Consol. Edison Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 94 (1937). 
71. See Consol. Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 238. 
72. As the Court wrote: 
The Act contemplates the making of contracts with labor organizations. That is the 
manifest objective in providing for collective bargaining. Under Section 7 the employees of 
the companies are entitled to self-organization, to join labor organizations and to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The . . . employees who were 
members of the Brotherhood and its locals . . . had the right to choose the Brotherhood as 
their representative for collective bargaining and to have contracts made as the result of 
that bargaining. 
Id. at 236 (footnote omitted). 
73. See id. at 238. 
74. Id. at 237. The Board cited Consolidated Edison with approval of its endorsement of 
members-only bargaining in Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 4 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
75. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 29 (1962). 
76. Dick’s Sporting Goods Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. 
Counsel, Div. of Advice, Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Gerald Kobel, Reg’l Dir.,  
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Employee Council and sought recognition from the employer on behalf of its 
members only.77 When management declined to recognize or bargain with the 
Council, the employees filed a section 8(a)(5) charge, but the NLRB General 
Counsel refused to issue a complaint, stating simply that the law leaving an 
employer free to refuse to bargain on a members-only basis is “well settled and is 
not an open issue.”78 The Board has thus far refused repeated invitations to adopt 
a rule, either through rulemaking or in adjudication, requiring members-only 
bargaining.79 
The Board has also held that an employer does not violate section 8(a)(1) by 
refusing to meet with groups of workers for purposes of adjusting particular 
grievances. In Charleston Nursing Center, the Board held that an employer did not 
violate section 8(a)(1) when it refused to meet with a group of nurses, but offered 
to meet with each nurse individually.80 The Board has also held that an employer 
did not violate the duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) or the prohibition on 
discrimination under section 8(a)(3) when, during the term of an agreement 
negotiated on a members-only basis, it unilaterally subcontracted out work to a 
nonunion contractor and laid off union members who had done the 
subcontracted work.81 Moreover, the Board has held that an employer did not 
 
Region 6, NLRB 13 (June 22, 2006), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx 
/09031d45800da97d. 
77. Id. at 2 
78. Id. at 1. 
79. Fisk & Tashlitsky, supra note 67, at 3. The statutory support for an argument for limiting 
the employer’s obligation to bargain to a majority union is section 8(a)(5)’s statement that an employer 
commits an unfair labor practice if it refuses “to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] 
employees, subject to the provisions” of section 9(a). National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012). Section 9(a) does not explicitly limit bargaining to a union chosen by a 
majority. It says that “[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.” Id. 
§ 159(a). It does not say that such unions are the only type that an employer must recognize. Section 
9(a), as amended by Taft-Hartley, also provides that “a group of employees shall have the right at any 
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the 
intervention of the bargaining representative.” Id. The debate over whether employees enjoy a right to 
members-only bargaining has focused on whether the “subject to the provisions of Section 159(a)” 
language of section 8(a)(5) limits the duty to bargain to a majority union that enjoys exclusivity. See 
Fisk & Tashlitsky, supra note 67, at 5–10 (summarizing the literature). The debate also focuses on 
whether the right of a group of employees to have their “grievances” adjusted contemplates only the 
adjustment of particular grievances or whether it is a more general right to group bargaining. See id. at 
15. 
80. Charleston Nursing Ctr., 257 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1981); see also Swearingen Aviation Corp., 
227 N.L.R.B. 228 (1976), enforced in part and denied in part, 568 F.2d 458, 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(resolving that although an employer violates section 8(a)(1) by discharging employees who ask to 
meet as a group to resolve grievances, the employer does not violate section 8(a)(1) by refusing to 
meet with them as a group if there is no bargaining representative selected by a majority). 
81. Mendenhall, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1110 (1972). The Board acknowledged that while it 
had never “ruled squarely on the legality per se of a members-only contract, the insufficiency under the 
Act of such recognition has been well established.” Id. (citation omitted). The Board also stated that a 
violation of the duty to bargain “requires as a predicate . . . that the employee representative has been 
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violate sections 8(a)(2) or 8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition of one union, with 
which it had long bargained on a members-only basis for a group of employees, 
and granting exclusive recognition to another union, with which it had long 
bargained for all its employees, including the minority.82 But no Board decision, in 
either a group grievance case like Charleston Nursing Center or in a members-only 
bargaining case like Dick’s Sporting Goods, has explained why the regime premised 
on majority rule and exclusivity is the only basis upon which employers are 
required to bargain with employees; in all of these cases the Board has simply 
assumed the rule rather than justified it on the basis of statutory analysis or 
policy.83 
While the Board’s decisions make clear that members-only bargaining is not 
required by the NLRA, they do not prohibit it if the employer and union 
voluntarily agree to bargain on a members-only basis, and such agreements are 
enforceable. Most importantly, the Board has never addressed the proposal we 
make: that a union have the right to demand that an employer engage in members-
only bargaining in right-to-work states. Whatever the legal and policy arguments in 
favor of requiring employers to engage in members-only bargaining in every state, 
the legal and policy arguments in favor of members-only bargaining in right-to-
work states are stronger. The principle of exclusivity assumes that because all 
benefit from collective representation, all must share in the costs in order to avoid 
free riding.84 But if right-to-work laws prohibit cost sharing, unions are burdened 
with the costs of representing employees who do not wish it and will not pay for 
it. Where employees can opt out of contributing anything to union representation, 
the union ought to have the option to construct a bargaining unit consisting only 
of those who will contribute to the union enterprise. This is a good and principled 
reason to relax the rules of exclusivity in right-to-work states. Allowing members-
only bargaining in these settings advances the preferences of workers who wish 
not to be in the union, the interests of unions who wish not to represent free-
 
designated or selected as the exclusive representative of the employees. It has been settled since the 
early days of the Act that members-only recognition does not satisfy statutory norms.” Id. 
82. Mfg. Woodworkers Ass’n, 194 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1123 (1972). The Board explained: 
[A] history of collective bargaining on a “members only” basis does not provide an 
adequate basis for representation nor the appropriateness of a bargaining unit such as the 
statute contemplates. The Board has traditionally refused to give weight to such a 
bargaining history, or to require its continuance, and we will not do so here. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot find that the Respondent association was obligated to continue 
to recognize the Painters as the exclusive bargaining representative either for all wood 
finishers, as provided in previous contracts, or for an alleged unit of wood finishers 
comprising association shops in which members of the Painters are employed. In view of 
the Carpenters’ status as the actual representative of a majority of production employees of 
all association members, including the wood finishers, we find that the General Counsel 
has not established that the actions of the association in recognizing and bargaining with 
the Carpenters constituted illegal assistance to the Carpenters. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
83. See Charleston Nursing Ctr., 257 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1981); Dick’s Sporting Goods Advice 
Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, supra note 76, at 4. 
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741 (1963). 
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riding workers, and the interests of union members in not subsidizing the 
representation of their objecting coworkers. 
One question our argument raises is whether members-only bargaining 
would be the only option in right-to-work states or whether a union that wished to 
be the exclusive representative could continue to be such. Given the lack of 
experience that unions, employers, and workers have with members-only 
unionism—at least in the modern context85—we think that a permissive and 
experimental approach is appropriate. At this stage, that is, the Board would give 
unions an additional option: if unions wish to engage in members-only bargaining, 
they would be entitled to do so, and the employer would then be obligated to 
bargain with the union on behalf of its members only. If the employer and the 
union negotiated an agreement covering only members, any employee who wished 
to get the benefit of the agreement could, of course, join the union and thereby 
the bargaining unit. Any employee who did not wish to be covered by the 
agreement could simply decline to join the union. If, instead, a union insisted on 
exclusivity, the parties would then simply be in the same position they are in under 
current law. 
To accept our position would also require rethinking the contours of section 
8(a)(3) and section 8(b)(2). We conclude that an employer would not discriminate, 
within the meaning of section 8(a)(3), by negotiating different terms with the 
union than it does with unrepresented employees, unless it could be shown that 
the employer did so for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union 
membership. Proof of such an intent may be difficult to establish, but the concept 
is not novel in the law.86 Under existing constitutional equal protection and Title 
VII disparate treatment law, it is not unlawful to treat groups of people differently 
so long as the different treatment is not motivated by race, gender, or another 
 
85. See Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee 
Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 197 (1993) (noting that “the tradition of American ‘trade 
unions’ throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth century was to bargain only for their 
members”). 
86. In one case, the Board stated that an employer encouraged union membership by 
discriminating against nonmembers, violating section 8(a)(3), by refusing to grant nonunion 
employees the same wages and benefits offered to union members under a members-only agreement. 
Reebie Storage & Moving Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 510, 510, 512 (1993), enforcement denied, 44 F.3d 605 (7th 
Cir. 1995). The Board in Reebie did not decide that differences in pay, benefits, or conditions in a 
members-only bargaining situation always (or ever) constitute discrimination for or against union 
members, because in that case, the record was unclear about whether the basis of the section 8(a)(3) 
charge was refusing to extend the contract terms to the formerly nonunion employees once they 
joined the union, failing to make contributions to the union benefits funds for nonmembers, or 
regarding other efforts to discourage employees from joining the union. Id. at 540. The principal 
focus of the Board’s analysis was whether the General Counsel properly issued a complaint charging 
discrimination against nonunion members when the charge had alleged discrimination against union 
members and failure to provide information to the union. Id. at 513. It is fair to say that Board law 
remains unclear as to the circumstances when a members-only agreement violates section 8(a)(3) if its 
terms are different than those offered nonmembers. 
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protected trait.87 If the employer can get employees to work for less than the 
collectively bargained minimum, it would not be discriminating for the purpose of 
encouraging or discouraging union membership by paying them less, but rather would just 
be paying what the labor market would allow. If the employer decided to pay 
nonmembers more than what the collective bargaining agreement required, 
because it thought that nonunion workers were more productive, or because its 
ability to fire them at will meant that their labor costs on average were lower even 
if their wages were higher, then it would not be discriminating for the purpose of 
encouraging or discouraging union membership.88 Of course, paying nonunion workers 
less than their union counterparts might have the effect of encouraging union 
membership, just as paying nonunion workers more would have the effect of 
discouraging union membership. But what section 8(a)(3) makes unlawful is not 
disparate treatment, but disparate treatment for the purpose of encouraging or 
discouraging membership.89 If the employer has legitimate business reasons for 
the differential pay rates, the requisite unlawful intent would be lacking.90 
We have proposed that the NLRB change its rule to allow members-only 
bargaining in states that have enacted right-to-work legislation. The proposal is 
logically consistent with the premise of right-to-work legislation in that it allows 
employees to avoid all the burdens of union representation. Nothing in the NLRA 
or in the decisions of the Supreme Court is inconsistent with our proposal. 
Indeed, the Court has recognized since 1938 that members-only bargaining is 
necessary to protect section 7 rights in the absence of a certified or recognized 
majority union,91 and has held members-only bargaining agreements enforceable 
under section 301.92 Thus, the Board is free to adopt—by rulemaking or in an 
adjudication—a rule requiring an employer to engage in members-only bargaining 
 
87. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (holding that city’s use of an at-large 
electoral system did not violate equal protection, even though no blacks were elected in a city with a 
substantial black population, and despite the city’s long history of racial discrimination, because there 
was insufficient evidence that the electoral system was adopted with a discriminatory purpose); Pers. 
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979) (holding that state law that gave employment 
preference to veterans, when ninety-eight percent of veterans in the state were male and the state 
knew its veterans preference would disadvantage women, did not violate equal protection because 
there was no discriminatory purpose). 
88. This is analogous to the courts’ approach to cases involving discrimination in pay for work 
of comparable worth. If the labor market results in school teachers or nurses or other predominantly 
female occupations being paid less than garbage collectors or truck drivers or other predominantly 
male occupations, courts have generally held that the unequal pay scales are not sex discriminatory. 
See Daniel R. Fischel & Edward P. Lazear, Comparable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 891, 894 (1986) (surveying literature and law and arguing that comparable worth is never 
appropriately used); George Rutherglen, The Theory of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for Discrimination, 82 
GEO. L.J. 135, 145–46 (1993) (surveying literature and case law and arguing that comparable worth 
theory is appropriately used as a remedy). 
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (prohibiting discrimination in terms of employment “to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization”). 
90. See id. 
91. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 238 (1938). 
92. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17, 29 (1962). 
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where employees demand it in states that have enacted laws prohibiting a union 
from requiring nonmembers to pay for the services the union provides. 
III. REMOVING THE OBLIGATION TO REPRESENT NONMEMBERS FOR FREE 
As the previous section explains, we believe that one principled response to 
the conflict between the federal principle of exclusive representation and state 
right-to-work laws is relaxing the requirement of exclusive representation in right-
to-work states. But there is a more modest possibility for resolving the conflict as 
well. In particular, we suggest that so long as unions in right-to-work states 
operate under a regime of exclusive representation, they ought to be able to charge 
nonmembers for the costs of individual representation in grievance and arbitration 
procedures. 
Two components of federal labor law currently operate to preclude unions 
from discriminating between members and nonmembers generally, and from 
charging fees to nonmembers for grievance services in particular. The first is 
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the statute, which makes it an unfair labor practice for a 
union to “restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” in 
section 7.93 Those section 7 rights, of course, include the right to refrain from 
joining or assisting a union.94 As is relevant here, the Board has held that if a 
union provides more or better representation to members than to nonmembers, 
the differential treatment, by making membership in the union more appealing 
than nonmembership, restrains the nonmembers’ right not to join the union.95 The 
second is the duty of fair representation, a judicially crafted doctrine that requires 
unions to represent all employees in a bargaining unit fairly and on an equal basis, 
irrespective of the employees’ status as member or nonmember.96 Both the courts 
and the Board have held that the duty of fair representation forbids a union from 
bargaining contract terms that favor members over nonmembers97 and, more to 
the point here, from treating members and nonmembers differently with respect 
to representation in disciplinary matters.98 
In non-right-to-work states, the obligation to represent nonmembers equally 
does not generally obligate the union to provide representation services to 
employees free of charge.99 In those states, again, unions can negotiate collective 
bargaining provisions that require nonmembers to pay dues and fees equivalent to 
 
93. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). 
94. See id. § 157. 
95. Furniture Workers Div., 291 N.L.R.B. 182, 183 (1988); Columbus Area Local, Am. Postal 
Workers Union, 277 N.L.R.B. 541, 543 (1985); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 
Union No. 697, 223 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 (1976). 
96. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). 
97. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967). 
98. See, e.g., Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1944); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 223 
N.L.R.B. at 834. 
99. See, e.g., Housing Auth. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 557, 885 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Ky. 
1994). 
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those paid by members, and these dues and fees can be used to cover the costs of 
representation.100 In right-to-work states, on the other hand, unions are precluded 
from bargaining such provisions and, without more, are in fact obligated to 
provide representational services for free.101 To avoid this problem, unions in 
right-to-work states have attempted to charge nonpaying nonmembers the cost of 
providing representation in grievance and arbitration proceedings.102 
But in a series of cases, the NLRB has held that a union violates section 
8(b)(1)(A) if it charges nonmembers a fee to cover the costs of disciplinary 
representation.103 Why? According to the Board, to charge nonmembers a fee for 
such representation, but not to charge members the same fee, is to discriminate on 
the basis of membership.104 And, by discriminating against nonmembers in this 
way, the union restrains them in their exercise of the right not to join or assist 
labor unions.105 Indeed, the Board has gone so far as to argue that a state right-to-
work rule that permits unions to charge a fee for representation is preempted by 
the federal statute.106 
In our view, the Board’s rule is wrong as a matter of policy: if unions in 
right-to-work states are obligated to provide representational services to 
nonmembers, the union ought not have to do so for free. Indeed, it is difficult to 
come up with any reasonable defense for a regime that obligates the union to 
provide representational services directly to individual workers, but precludes 
them from recovering the costs of those services. 
More importantly, the Board’s rule is also wrong as a matter of law: if a 
union decides to offer representational services to employees who pay for them, 
and to deny such services to employees who do not pay for them, the union is not 
discriminating on the basis of membership. Instead, the union is discriminating on 
the basis of who pays and who does not. 
This distinction would be obvious in any other context. Take, for example, a 
hypothetical from the context of gender discrimination. An airline, as a common 
carrier, could not refuse service to women and insist on transporting only men.107 
But this prohibition on gender discrimination does not imply that women are 
entitled to fly on the airline for free. To the contrary, if the airline declined to issue 
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tickets to people who declined to pay, while agreeing to issue tickets to all who 
agreed to pay, the airline would not be guilty of gender discrimination even if only 
women declined to pay. The basis for the disparate treatment would be wholly 
legitimate.108 
What a union cannot do is refuse to represent nonmembers because they are 
nonmembers: if the nonmember pays for representation, she must receive it. The 
union must, under General Motors, give the nonmember the opportunity to pay for 
representation without the obligation to become a member.109 But a policy that 
requires everyone—member or nonmember—to pay for representational services 
does not discriminate on the basis of membership status, just as a policy that 
everyone—man or woman—pay for airline tickets does not discriminate on the 
basis of gender. 
But this basic point does not resolve our question. If a union charges 
nonmembers the actual costs of representation in grievance and arbitration 
matters, the cost paid by the nonmember would likely exceed the cost borne by 
members. In one Board case, for example, the actual cost of representation in an 
arbitration proceeding was about thirty times the cost of a member’s annual 
dues.110 The question, accordingly, is whether a union discriminates against 
nonmembers when it charges nonmembers more than members for 
representational services. 
Our view is that it does not, so long as the amount the union charges 
nonmembers does not exceed the actual cost of representation. This is true 
because, in this context, dues payments function as a type of insurance—they are a 
way that workers pool the risk that any individual will be subject to discipline and 
will need representation in grievance and arbitration proceedings. Each month, 
dues-paying employees make a form of premium payment to the union, some 
portion of which funds the union’s representational expenses. The great majority 
of employees never face discipline, and these employees do not recoup this 
portion of their dues through representation provided by the union. On the other 
hand, the minority of employees that end up facing discipline and needing union-
funded representation are subsidized by the dues payments made by other 
employees. As a result of the risk pooling, these employees thus pay less than the 
actual cost of the representational service the union provides. 
Critically, those employees who do not make payments to the union have 
chosen not to participate in the risk pooling. If they never face discipline, they will 
have saved considerably. But if they do face discipline, they have no legitimate 
basis to assert that they should then pay only what they would have paid had they 
participated in the risk pool in the first place. This, of course, is no different than 
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in other insurance markets.111 The most obvious analogue is health insurance. 
Everyone who has health insurance pays premiums, and those who end up going 
to the doctor pay less than they would have paid had they not bought insurance. 
When, on the other hand, an individual does not buy health insurance, she will 
have to pay the full cost of the doctor’s services when she gets sick. If an 
individual does not buy the insurance, she may not claim that she should only 
have to pay what people who did buy the insurance actually paid for their 
premiums. 
As such, if a union were to charge nonmembers the cost of representation in 
grievance and arbitration, and allow members to receive those services in 
exchange for dues payments, the nonmember who actually faced discipline would 
pay more for representation than a member would pay in dues. But this is simply 
the cost structure faced by any individual in any insurance market. To say that 
such a cost structure discriminates against nonmembers is, again, incorrect. The 
cost structure simply benefits those who decided to take part in the risk pooling 
that the union offers. As long as that risk pooling is open to members and 
nonmembers on an equal basis—which it must be112—then there is no 
discrimination on the basis of union membership.113 
It is worth pointing out that although the Board, to date, has not adopted 
this analysis, we are not alone in believing that requiring nonmembers to pay for 
representation in grievance and arbitration proceedings does not constitute 
discrimination or coercive pressure to join the union. Indeed, at least one state—
in interpreting analogous provisions of its labor laws—has held precisely this. Cone 
v. SEIU Local 1107 involved a public sector union in Nevada that charged 
nonmembers a fee for individual representation.114 Whereas members’ dues 
payments covered all representation fees, nonmembers who wished to receive 
union representation paid a minimum of sixty dollars per hour for grievance 
consultation, fifty percent of the fee charged by hearing officers and arbitrators, 
and one hundred percent of the fees charged by union attorneys, up to two 
hundred dollars per hour.115 Nevada law, like federal law, prohibits unions from 
discriminating between members and nonmembers, and it also prohibits “restraint 
and coercion” in the exercise of the right not to join unions.116 Nonetheless, the 
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Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed a challenge to Local 1107’s fee policy.117 
Rejecting the idea that charging nonmembers for individual representation 
constituted an unfair labor practice—even though such charges clearly would 
exceed the cost of dues—the court held that “[there is] no discrimination or 
coercion . . . in requiring nonunion members to pay reasonable costs associated 
with individual grievance representation.”118 
Finally, even should the Board hold that a union may not charge nonpaying 
nonmembers more for disciplinary representation than the amount union 
members pay in dues, this would not preclude the union from charging 
nonmembers for representation.119 To the contrary, a union could implement a 
policy requiring nonmembers who receive union representation in disciplinary 
matters to pay the same amount that members pay to receive the same benefit. 
Although several approaches are possible, one would be as follows: the union 
would first calculate the proportion of regular dues payments that are used to fund 
representational activity. It would then determine the number of months the 
nonmember employee has been in the bargaining unit. It would then calculate 
how much a union member would have paid over that time span to cover 
representational costs. Thus, for example, if dues are ten dollars per year and 
twenty percent of dues goes to representational activity, then a member pays two 
dollars per month to cover representational expenses. If a nonmember receives 
representation at the end of her fifth year (or sixtieth month) of employment in 
the unit, she would owe the union $120 for the disciplinary representation—
precisely what a member would have paid. Again, charging nonmembers what 
members pay cannot in any meaningful sense be considered discriminatory, and it 
cannot be said to coerce nonmembers into joining a union. 
One final point bears mention. A collective bargaining agreement that 
requires union members to pay for grievance and arbitration services, but allows 
nonmembers to get the same services for free, quite plainly discourages union 
membership. Generally, of course, federal labor law frowns on terms in collective 
bargaining agreements that distinguish between employees based on union 
membership,120 and federal law makes illegal many actions that intend to 
discourage membership in labor unions.121 But the Board’s current rule 
prohibiting unions from charging for representational services would seem to 
require collective bargaining agreements in right-to-work states to discourage union 
membership. While the employer intent necessary for a finding of illegal 
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discrimination may be absent here,122 the Board’s rule certainly is inconsistent with 
the general intent of the NLRA to avoid terms of employment that discourage 
membership in labor unions. 
CONCLUSION 
The interaction of state right-to-work laws and the federal regime of 
exclusive representation creates a tension in American labor law: federal law 
requires unions to represent all employees equally, but right-to-work laws allow 
employees who are not union members to receive that representation for free 
while union members must pay. We see three ways to alleviate this tension. First, 
we have argued that, under a proper reading of the NLRA, states can ban 
compulsory payment of dues equivalent to what union members pay for collective 
bargaining and contract administration. But states may not prohibit all compelled 
payments from workers to unions. To the contrary, under a proper reading of 
section 14(b), all states must permit agreements that require objecting employees 
to pay the pro rata share of membership dues that go to grievance and arbitration 
expenses. 
Second, we have argued for members-only bargaining in right-to-work states. 
In states where employees are free to decline to pay for union representation, we 
have argued that the NLRB can and should relax the requirement of exclusive 
representation and allow unions to organize, bargain on behalf of, and represent 
only those workers who affirmatively choose to become members. If the heart of 
the argument for right-to-work laws is that exclusivity coerces those workers who 
do not want to be represented by a union, the law should protect their right to 
reject representation without compelling other workers, who wish to have a union, 
to subsidize services for them. 
Our third alternative proposal is that the NLRB abandon its rule forbidding 
unions from charging a nonmember a fee for representation services that the 
union provides directly and individually to the nonmember. As we have shown, 
and as experience in some states with right-to-work laws confirms,123 a fair reading 
of the intersection of the union’s duty of fair representation, and the rights of 
workers to refrain from joining or paying fees to a union, compels the conclusion 
that unions have no obligation to provide representational services to employees 
who do not pay for them. A rule that absolves the union of the duty to process 
grievances unless an employee has paid, or is willing to pay, her pro rata share of 
the cost of grievance processing is consistent with the general principles 
underlying contracts for professional services and does not discriminate within the 
meaning of the NLRA against those who do not pay fees to the union. 
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The stakes of the right-to-work debate have always been high, in large 
measure because unions find it unaffordable to operate in states where employees 
can secure the benefits of unionization without incurring any of its costs.124 But 
with an intensification of the drive to extend right-to-work laws into new states, 
the time has come to rectify a longstanding inequity in American labor law and 
alleviate the tension between the federal statute’s mandate of exclusive 
representation and the operation of state right-to-work laws. 
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